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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STArE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
-·;-
JAVID TYRONE SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 19283 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of an opinion filed by the 
Utah Supreme Court on September 16, 1986. (A copy of that opinion, 
State v. Smith, 42 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, is contained in Addendum A.) 
Originally this case was an appeal from a conviction and judgment 
for Burglary, a Third Degree Felony, and Theft, a Third 
Degree Felony, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant at 2 and 
in State v. Smith, 42 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Brown v. Pickard, denying reh'g, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), 
the Utah SupreDe Court stated the standard for the granting of a 
for ret1earing: "To justify a rehearing, a strong case must 
conclus1 1Jns, 'i: 11:, 
To make an appl1(:3. ... l1)fl t)r ,j .... 
matter oE right, and'"''" :·,a;.; :w .j"'·;··. 
discourage the pra.c::.1c1:" 11t f·)r 
rehearings in proper ::ases. tf,l.-; c1iur'::., 
however, has considered and de1:1 :l+--:'d 3ll ,Jf 
material questions invol ;ed in a .:'Lo"', a 
rehearing should not be applied f Jr, 1nless we 
have miscons:r·1ed or overlooked su·1e 
Eact or Eacts, or have overlooked some or 
decision which ma:; :iEfect the result, •)r ti: at "'"' 
have based the deci31on on sane 
oE law, or have either or overlooked 
something which materially affects :he result 
IE there are some reasons, however, such a.:; 
we have indicated above, or other good reasons, i 
petition Eor a rehearing shoulj be prompt!; filed 
and, iE it is meritorious, its Eor'.11 ;.1ill in no 
case be scrJtinized oy this court. 
The argunent section of this br:eE will establish that, appl;:-: 
these standards, the Appellant's petition Ear rehearing is pron-
before the Court and shoulj be granted. 
I. 
THE COURT ::RREJ c'.J ITS 
THE JISPUTSD JURY '.NSTRUCT'.)N :N CASE 
AND THE JF CASE J:RECTSY CONTRAJlCTS 
THIS COURT'S "'.OLJillG I"l ST.'.TE '/. ?..\CHECO 
ob]ect1on, ':.he ::.r1a: =1....1{J•]>? ':.--:e 
11·', :'t-:' eJ1dence tna':. the 
,_,::-.·>(1n :..n 1n +:.he proper'.::'/.· 
Thus, 1f you find from the evidence and 
DP;ond d reasonaole doubt, that the defendant was 
1n pos3es31on of property, that such 
P(J3sess!on of stolen property, that such 
possession was not too remote in point of time 
from the thett, and the defendant made no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession, then 
you may infer from those facts that the defendant 
committed the theft. 
You may use the same inference, if you find 
it justified by the evidence, to connect the 
possessor of recently stolen property with the 
offense of burglary. 
first Eull paragraph of the instruction contains the language of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402111 11953, as amended), while the remainder 
of the instruction explains the statutory language. 
A. INSTRUCTION NUMBER 20 WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
MANDATORY REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION. 
In upholding Instruction No. 20, this Court held that, when 
read "in light of its immediate context and the context of the 
instructions as a whole," the Jury in the case could not "have 
ceasonably applied the instructions in an unconstitutional manner.• 
State v. Smith, 42 Utah Adv. ?.ep. 14 at 16. The Court concluded 
that the instruction created only a permissible inference and was 
therefore allowable. In reaching this conclusion, the court 
stated: 
Lest there be a misunderstanding of our ruling in 
this case, we emphatically declare that we do not 
retreat from [State v. Chambers]. The trial 
court should not have used the statutory language 
1n the instruction for the reasons stated in 
Chambers. We hold only that the instruction 
cannot be deemed reversible error in this case in 
light of the clear explanatory instructions . 
1 r 
"Q • In fact, conclusion in this case stands in 
to the conclusion of State v. Chambers, 709 
?.:i 32'. l'Jt3n 11851 3r,d cases. 
In Chambers, this Court unequ1J•)Cally 
We therefore conclude that a JUr/ instruction 
using the language of U.C.A., 1953, §76-6-40211) 
is unconstitutional because it directly rel1tes 
to the issue of guilt and relieves the State of 
its burden of proof. . Thus, the statutory 
language should not be used in any form in 
instructing Juries in criminal cases, 
Id. at 327 (emphasis added). Despite this clear prohibition ,,n · 
use of the statutory language, in this case the Court upholds an 
instruction which used exactly the prohibited language. 
The basis for the prohibition on the use of the 
language in Chambers was that the Court found that the language 
formed a mandatory rebuttable presumption. The Court notecJ 
United States Supreme Court found the use of such presumptions 
unconstitutional in Francis v. Franklin, 105 s.ct. 1965, 85 
344 (1985). The Chambers Court stated that instructions conta:." 
mandatory rebuttable presumptions were unconstitutional because'· 
instructions relieved the State of its burden of proof and snif:, 
that burden to the defendant. 709 P.2d at 325, 326. Des pi ':e 
use of the same statutory language as in Chambers, which presuma:. 
created the same burden-shifting as in Chambers, the Court in:· 
case concluded that Instruction No. 20 created only a "permiss1"" 
inference.• 
The Court reached this conclusion because of the :angu;: 
of the remainder of Instruction tlo. 20 and the language of 
Instruction No. 23 which stated: 
The mere fact that a person was in conscious 
possession of recently stolen property is not 
sufficient to Justify a conviction of theft. 
There must be proof of other 
tending of themselves to establish guilt. 
However, such proof need not ce by 
evidence or witnesses if you find that 
the possession occurred under circumstances which 
warrants a finding of guilty, In this connection 
you may consider the defendant's conduct, any 
false or contradictory statements, and any other 
statements the defendant may have made with 
reference to the property. If the defendant 
gives a false account of how he acquired 
possession of stolen property this is a 
circumstance that may tend to show guilt. 
In the absence of evidence as to why the 
defendant was in possession of recently stolen 
property, you Day infer that the defendant stole 
the property. 
(R.114). The Court reasoned that if both of the instructions were 
considered together, the jury could not have applied the 
instructions in an unconstitutional manner. 42 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
16. This reasoning is also contradicted by Chambers in which this 
Court declared: 
rurther, although there was another instruction 
given, instruction No. 25, which restated the 
presumption in permissive form, the additional 
instruction failed to cure the defect. "Language 
that merely contradicts and does not explain a 
constitutionally infirm instruction will not 
suffice to absolve the infirmity.• 
709 P.2d at 326 (emphasis added, citation omitted). In State v. 
Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986), one jury instruction created a 
mandatory presumption which another instruction restated in 
permissive form . This Court stated: 
As in State v. Chambers where the challenged 
instruction was restated in permissive form, the 
additional instruction fails to cure the defect • 
. . . [A]ny reasonable juror could have been left 
in a quandary as to whether to follow the 
so-called explanatory instruction or the 
immediately preceding one it contradicted. 
720 P.2d at 1371-1372 (footnotes omitted). 
:n this case, as in Chambers and Tarafa, the jury was 
presented with contradictory, confusing instructions. Yet, it is 
unclear from the Court's opinion in this case why subsequent 
-5-
instructions which transform the s'tdtut-or:; cianda·,1r 
presumption into a permissive inference result in 
but reversal in Chambers and Tarafa. 
Another factor is present in this case which also 
contributed to the reversal in Tarafa. Here, as in Tarafa, the 
prosecutor emphasized the mandator:; nature of the presump: 1on. 
closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 
Now the question then becomes one of whether 
we have a burglary. You have been instructed by 
the Judge if a burglary occurs and someone is 
found with the property in his possession, he ma:; 
within a short period of time, it is called not 
too remote a time period from the time of the 
burglary until the time of possession, that you 
can infer that he committed the burglary. And 
taking it one step further that you can also 
infer that he committed the theft. This being 
the time period that the law provides that if you 
are going to have stolen property in your 
possession, and it is going to be right close to 
the time it was stolen, we can assume that you 
stole it. Unless you have a satisfactory 
explanation. 
(R.419-420). In Tarafa the Court concluded that the prosecutor'' 
statements in closing argument concerning the mandatory nature c: 
the presumption could have easily contributed to the Jury's 
confusion about the instructions. 720 ?.2d at 1371, n.16. The 
confusion must have been present in this case because the pros•: 
emphasized not the permissive character of the instructions 
rather their mandatory nature (if you have stolen property, ''•" 
assume you stole it." [ R. 4 20] ) . In this respect, this case 10 
indistinguishable from Tarafa. 
In summary, Instruction tlo. 20 gi·;en t•' t'ie ]Uc! 1n 
in Chambers stated 'should not be used 1n anj 1n 
JUr ie:-;." l..Q. e1t 327. Further, the opinion in this case fails to 
explain why subsequent instructions which restate the mandatory 
in permissible form rescue the challenged jury 
instruction here while in Chambers and Tarafa "the additional 
instructions fail to cure the defect [of the challenged 
instruction]" 709 P.2d at 326 and 720 P.2d at 1371. Finally, the 
prosecutor's emphasis of the mandatory nature of the presumption 
must have confused the jury here as it did in Tarafa. Because of 
these factors, the result in this case cannot be reconciled with the 
rc-sults of Chambers and Tarafa and rehearing should be granted. 
B. THE RESULT IN THIS CASE IS IN 
DIRECT OPPOSITION TO STATE 
V. PACHECO, WHICH CONTAINED 
A VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL INSTRUCTION. 
Appellant Smith further asserts that a rehearing should be 
granted in his case because the Court's opinion here is directly 
contrary to the opinion in State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 
1985), reh'g den'd 712 P.2d 192. 
The opinion in Pacheco was filed the same day as State v. 
Chambers and involved an instruction quite similar to that given in 
Chambers. In Pacheco the statutory presumption found in U.C.A. 
§76-6-402(1) was given in a jury instruction relating to a defendant 
charged with burglary. 712 P.2d at 194. This court reversed the 
conviction in Pacheco because of the verbatim recitation of the 
statutory presumption in the instruction. The Pacheco Court relied 
on the reasoning of State v. Chambers and the cases cited therein in 
its dec1s1on. 
(source: 
In Pacheco, Instruction No. 15 ueeid: i 
The law of the State of Utah as 
follows: 
"Possession of property 
recently stolen, when no satis-
factory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be prima 
facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property.• 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, (I) that the defendant 
was in possession of property, (II) that the 
property was stolen in a burglary, (III) that 
such possession was not too remote in point of 
time from the burglary, and (IV) that the 
defendant had made no satisfactory explanation of 
such possession, then you find from those 
facts that the defendant committed the burglary 
in which such property was stolen and stole the 
property. 
State's Petition for Rehearing in State·;. Pacheco ac 
4)(Addendum S) (emphasis added). In this case Instruction ilo. :. 
stated: 
Utah Law provides that: 
"Possession of property recently stolen 
when no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall oe pr1ma fac1e 
evidence that the person in possession stole 
the property." 
Thus, if you find from the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant ..ias 
in possession of stolen property, that such 
possession was not too remote in point of cime 
from the and the defendant made no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession, then 
you infer from those facts that the defendant 
committed the theft. 
r:----fnstruction t1o. 15, gi·;en in toto here, ·..ias ne·;er repr•J•1c.· 
l ts en ti re t y in the opinion in . ? ache co . 
-d-
You may use the same inference, if you find 
1t ]ust1f1ed by the evidence, to connect the 
possessor of recently stolen property with the 
offense of burglary. 
1c<.llll (emphasis added). Even a cursory comparison reveals that 
the two instructions are nearly identical. Both instructions give a 
verbatim recitation §76-6-402(1). Both instructions then give 
explanations of the statutory language. Both instructions' 
require the Jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant was in possession of recently stolen without 
a satisfactory explanation. If the JUry finds these 
predicate facts, then both instructions state that the Jury 
find from those facts that the defendant committed the crime in 
question. 
Instruction No. 15 in Pacheco restated the language of the 
statute in permissive form as did Instruction No. 20 in this case. 
Yet the Pacheco instruction was found unconstitutional while the 
instruction in this case was upheld. The results of the two cases 
are clearly not rationally compatible. 
The opinion in this case notes that another instruction, 
number 23, also emphasizes the permissive character of the inference 
of guilt created by Instruction No. 20. Smith at 16,n.l. Since no 
other instructions are mentioned in the Pacheco opinion, one may 
argue that this distinguishes the two cases. However, in its 
Petition for Rehearing in Pacheco, the State urged this court to 
consider at least four other instructions given in that case as 
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ameliorating the defect in the challPnged instruction. I Add enc 
at 7-9). By denying that Petition for Rehearing, the> Court re;c 
the very argument which is now used to rationalize the decisian 
this case. 
One final, practical factor must be considered with re 
to Pacheco. Since the Instruction No. 20 given in this case ana 
Instruction No. 15 in Pacheco are virtually identical, practiti:· 
and trial courts are left in a quandary by the two opinions. 
Pacheco instruction was declared unconstitutional while the 
nearly-identical instruction in this case was upheld. Practiti:·. 
and trial courts will be hard-pressed to discern which instruct; 
are allowable and which are defective. Indeed, the Court seems 
be drawing lines so fine that they are impossible to perceive. 
In summary, Instruction No. 20 which was upheld in tin; 
case is virtually identical to Instruction No. 15 which was str;, 
down in Pacheco. The argument that was used to uphold this 
instruction (that other instructions tended to cure any defecti 
rejected by this Court in Pacheco. No rational explanation can. 
advanced to allow both opinions to co-exist. The decision in :· 
case is clearly contradictory to Pacheco and should be 
reconsidered. 
POINT II. INSTRUCTIONS 20 AND 23 COMBINED TO FORCE 
THE DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY IN VIOLATION OF 
HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS. 
In his opening brief, Appellant Smith argued tnat the 
statutory presumption as manifested in the JUry instructions f; 
him to testify in violation of ni3 Fifth Amendment rights. 
- l 'i-
opinion in this case relies on several cases to defeat this 
argument. However, careful examination of the primary cases cited 
by the Court shows that they are distinguishable from the present 
case. 
Instruction No. 20, supra at 3, clearly stated that the 
defendant himself was required to give a satisfactory explanation of 
his possession of recently stolen property. Instruction No. 23 
(Addendum C) continued to keep the focus on the defendant by 
allowing the jury to reach the statutory presumption by simply 
disbelieving the defendant's explanation or finding it 
contradictory. 
The opinion in this case relies on Barnes v. United States, 
412 U.S. 837 (1973) to defeat Mr. Smith's claim. However, in Barnes 
the instruction given to the jury did not require an explanation 
directly from the defendant. In Barnes, the defendant's possession 
of recently stolen property could simply be explained by "facts and 
circumstances in [the] case which are in some way consistent with 
the defendant's innocence." 512 U.S. at 840, n.3. No direct 
testimony from the defendant was required. 
State v. Chambers, supra, also cited by the Court in this 
case, presented a similar question. However, as in Barnes, the 
Chambers Court stated: 'Nothing in the instruction required 
testimony by defendants, because an explanation of possession could 
have been made by the testimony of other witnesses or by other 
evidence." 709 P.2d at 325. 
The distinction between Barnes and Chambers and this case 
is subtle but important. As noted above, neither nor the 
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Chambers instructions rgqu1red the defendant to In tr, 
cases a "reasonable explanation" of possession of recently stoJ' 
property could emanate from any source, including the State's 
witnesses. However, Instruction No. 20 in this case specifica; 
required that the defendant himself provide the explanation of 
possession. According to the instruction, if the defendant did 
testify, the jury was virtually bound to enter a verdict of gu 1;-
Such a result clearly violates the protections secured by the f:: 
Amendment. Because the cases cited by the Court in support of 1 
opinion are distinguishable and because of the uniqueness of the 
instruction in this case, which could be satisfied only by the 
defendant's testimony, a rehearing should be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the opinion in this case misapplied State v. 
Chambers and State v. Tarafa and erroneously applied Barnes v. 
United States and because the opinion in this case is in direct 
conflict with State v. Pacheco, the Appellant, David Tyrone Sm1· 
respectfully petitions this court to reconsider its decision anc 
reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial or 
dismissal of the charges. 
Respectfully submitted this of October, 1986. 
CORTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Petitioner 
-12-
I hereby certify that I delivered four copies of the 
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case and; 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATION 
I, CURTIS C. NESSET, do hereby certify the following: 
(ll I am the attorney for appellant/petitioner in this 
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court 
in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this of October, 1986. 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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ADDENDml A 
IN l llF: -;[ PIU.\IE COl Rf 
OF THE SI.\ H. OF l L\H 
The "'T\TE of ltah. 
Pli:un11ff and Re<,pondrnl, 
0:1\id THonr S'flTH. 
Defendanl and .-.\ppellanl. 
I "\o 192!0 
ILED: .;,;eplemht>r 16, 1986 
TlllRD DISTRICI 
1 H,rn H,,mer F \\ ill-1nson 
·\ T10R.'-'Er '> 
OJ\1d L \\ i ';tephen \11kita, 
P10rnas D \ u\k tor P1.:1111uff and 
Rt'srnndent 
(_,J11111e L \10\\t'f for Defendant and 
\;--rellar• 
STE\\ ·\RT, Justice: 
The Jrrcllant, Oa\1d Tyrone Sm11h, \.\JS 
J'll\IC'.ed Q1, .1 ;•irv ot burglary Jnd theft. 
1 l'c)\h third degree felonies Un 1rreal he 
!ll LC\. cstabi-
Jr, unuJr.s11t·11!cnal that 
,1112 n recent!) <.wlen porertv 
p1I·· Jf ;1J" qc·l-:n 1t JnJ :hJ.t that 
'\ l<J" <;u1fic1ent 
ll' -IJr'f"Jft ) ;·-.:d!V ·.erd1d: h15 
,hould nci1 liJ\e heen rerm11ted :o iemfv 
h11'1 ,11cr fll', 'Ji:'1ect1on: 131 he "-3S 
:'j I,_! '.('qlf\ \(' -ebLJI the rfC"iUIT'.p{lOn 
1n v1ola11on Jf his 
gc•, cnr)Ugh ni0ney for 11, she pawned the 
s.J 'oi:ihone Instead 
11\1' '1 .\ 1·,h Jtld rhe 
,,, 't 11 1 ',l' r·t., 1 .... '\0r·h .d11dl belu-
.c·_J l 11<.1•, I: l"!,:'>. A!111 ,•, r••d 11 :n 
,q ,,·•1;,r'" Ill cl hl'Cr"r.ent 
Srrnth"s •.ef51on of the facts was substanti-
<.1lly different than Tonia's He admitted he 
h.Jd had posses'iton of the saxophone, but 
le'>til1ed that Tonia had given it to him on 
December 26. 1982, and had asked him to 
'l<t•.': \nnette 
'•1·.·I ':n tc· ,.,i<>en Oc.ernber 
1 to en ·, 1•:: 
\11111 .ind !Jc.•.·mh:r 
·.1\1 1 r:d !he 
the Jav the 
'd\(1rt1,·rie \' 1, ,,;1ncone broke into 
' 1:c 11n11 anJ '.he C:.m1th lived 
i hnld it for her until the next day This evid-
, ence contradicted his testimony that he told 
Kearns, the St. Mark's supervisor, that he 
c11her had, or was supposed lo have, played 
the saxophone al a performance m Ogden the 
pre" ious weekend 
1·lc T•"'n1:::i v.as <;tc1:1ng \\1th a 
1n ,·11n-: JfMtment :0mr'lex. 0ccu-
r1d r 1 '•1ch:n. .·.here S1nith 1,1s1ted her 
•(".er:il'.1mer, 
-\t 1;1JI, lr:n111fc• 1--:earm. J :;uper\15or at 
'-' 'L1r:... ·,, ·' l1c1c '-irnith ::•ed. t11Jt 
'ii:.' ;,3.1 rhe J::l<"nJJn\ J( s· \\llh '.he 
-.1• '\ 1 11,,ne H,· ··,'id her •hJt •he '<lxophone 
.' ·1h 1nJ ·1111 1-ic hJd .la• :i pcrform-
.irLc- !he rrc fllJ\ She •hat 
"irn1lll made 1HJ Jl'empt to hide the 1t1s1ru-
·:r rv he f\J<,1\e abou! it during •he 
.er<.a'Lun 1-(..;Jr:-i-. not date 
·1,e Ho»e'.er. Sm:!h ldrnitted 
''-:c -'-'n·.er,Jt1.rn and ·eq1f1ed :hat 1l occurred 
Jn "e 'TL rn1rie, nl De:emr:.:r 1982 
\m,!her ,urer\1\or, TJm \\ebb :e-.:1f1ed that 
«:n1C'."TH'. fH(lbJbl1 <llonlv Jf 1 •.'r Christmas. 
iit 11(1'1·-.::·:d ,1 'J'orho11(' 111 J :.1:;e 1n '.he St 
in:1111 d::'-e J :-'1ece c"'t 11aper 
ed ,)11,• 1hc-;- 1:nr •he L·Jp beJnr.g 
'-im1t'1 ) 'ull 1anit• The 1<.or den:ified 1 
1 '1l' ;;Jxcrnone bv J rO·Jnd \h,te 'eJl on 
'h1ch hr rem-:mbereJ ,ee1nis. the 1 
,a,urhnne 1n !he c·ffice He J.lso 1,1,as 
1rJblc •o 'Ice date Jn\' more exacth 
\\ l '"1e:1c! ,,f hoth Smtth 
i·.J '11, 111e ·e-•11·,·,J •t.:11 Dcce-
:- T·'": 1 _:111ed her :inJ J'lked "ler to 1 
1 '-: ,.,rne•hir . .; '(\f he' She ,J1d T Jr.13. told 
in ,\'L; 1H'.e'..1vJ :n0nn '\ :-ien \\ d!1Jms 
;':, T1'n1.i 1q1 J fe·.\ rnrnL!!t'' l:1t:-r. Tonia 
Jr• 111.:r ·c 't"' Sm::r. rl:id: 'O pick up 
. hJ! ,\JS going 'O iet her pawn 
\\ J1d T"'.Ot kncv. v.Js to be 
I'·' ·me.! T1Jn1a .>.etH 1n:o St \lark's and 
,1 irh !t-.e 'a\orhone \t first. Tonia 
•11.11 ,lJe Jnred '.\ 1\li,uns ro pav.n a 
-\:-·:r ·1·.n Jrrl\d .J! li1c shop, 
f'Jf-.:' •!l'td her 1Je'.111tn:Jt1on. l:iut •he 
fvnia and 
T''" 1 1,1, iii, <c-1 ·c, ":,•1f, "'\Cr Sm11h·s 
'-,1'• .. 1 'he 11ni1'JI e·.1denL1Jry 
,.., 1 , ·kl'.· ti 11 i,,. '•IJ her 11.: lud ,l ,1,or;hone 
,i 1 1 .i _! ill' ,"Jf "i!J Belinda 
' • 1: 1• '1·: tolj 1ler 
,j •(''l ,fl Jt 5t 
The trial Judge instructed .the Jury, over 
Smith's objection, as ft:illows (the lirst para-
graph being the language of §76-6-402(1)): 
Utah Law provides that: 
'Possession of property recently 
no .;;atisfactory explana-
tion of rnch possession 1s made, shall 
be prima fac1e evidence that the 
person in possession stole the proper- · 
ty ., 
Thus. if JOU find from the evidence 
and beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the defendant was in possession of 
stolen property, that such posse-ss1on 
v.as not too remote in point of llme 
from the theft, and the defendant 
made no )Jtlsfactory explanation of 
such pos.;;ession, then you may infer 
from those racts that the defendant 
commit:ed :he theft. 
You may use the same inference. if 
;.ou tind it JUSl!fied by the evidence, 
to connect the possessor of recently 
stolen property with the offense of 
burglary. 
I. 
On appeal. Smith argues that §76-6-
l) is uncomt1tutional because it imposes 
a st:itutory presumption of guilt that is not 
r:itional and therefore is a violation of due 
process under Toi \I. Umted States, 319 U.S. 
, 463 (1943), and Leary v. Unued States, 395 
1 L1 S 6 ( 1969). He claims that his convictions 
".\ere based solely on the statutory presump-
tion and that they therefore must be reversed. 
The defendant is in error. At the outset, we 
note tha.t the statute, properly construed, 
does not establish an evidenllary presump-
·c1on. alone a presumption of guilt. State \I. 
1 Chambers, P 2d 321, J26-27 (Utah 
! 985). In Chambers. we held that a jury inst-
ruction using the language of §76·6·402(1) 
ts unconslJ!utlonJ.i because it "relieves the 
1 StJte cf its burden of proof • Chambers, 709 
P 2d it J2-:' St•e Ji so State v Pacheco, 71 :! 
1i 2J !92 'l'tah 1985). An tnstruction that T ..._,n11 
, ·:: 1 , 1,._, ·, 1,t ,anted 51mpl) incorporates the statutory language is 
1"11 ,:,<::l he _,)uld not unconstltuuonat .\hen the statutory term .. 
,,, 
t ir ,orinu/J!\\t Lr \ll t ODl. see the second section of th15 ls.sue. 
16 l'l \It .\IJ\A:\( F IU.l'OHI-., 
pr1rna !Joe· 1\ JdincJ J) J 
.,,., a<; the -:a'e 1n C hJm/->cr1 rt" 
ekmenl.irv that .... e r::.id L1n>: 1,,_J)?C 1•f t'l 
in\truction in !tght of 11\ 1mml'j1,1te cnntnl 
and the coTl!e"<! lif lfhlru1..!1('rl'> J'i -1 
v.hole. In the same 111<.truc'HHl !hat 1nuHro1 
ated the 3tatutoq l<.1nguage of 6-..t02( I), 
the trial ..:ourt carefully stat:-d th.1t the \1Jtu 
tory language meant only that 1( !he jur\ 
found certain facts that 'you mav .nrc1 frum 
those facts that the defendant co.mmitted the 
theft." (Emphasis added ) The court al\o 
instructed the jur) that 1t could infer a burg-
laf) "if you find it justified by the t"\1dcnce 
Th'ls, the court e1e;plained that the statutory 
language incorporated in the instruc11on 
al\oY.ed onlv an inference of euilt. anJ then 
only if Justified by the fact; Indeed. the 
court made the same po1m e\.en more e'<teno;,-
1\.ely in a later instruct101i. 1 
We do not helieve that the jun·, in the face 
ot these instruc11ons, could ha•e reac;onabh 
applied the instructions in an unconstitutional 
manner. 
Furthermore, the '.nal lourt explained to 
the JUry that possession alone of a stolen 
obiect is 1101 sufficient to support a com1c-
11on, a rule that has been reiterated 1n nurne-
rou'i orinions. ln Seate \'. Hcach, 27 Utah 
11. 15, 492 P 2d 978. 979 11972), !he Court 
stated: 
The mere possession 0f qolen 
prorer1 y une,plarned by !he perscn 111 
charge thereof is :rot in anJ ol itself 
sul ric1ent to JUSt1fv a (Cmiction of 
l.Jrceny of the property It is, 
ho· ... e•er, 1 circumstance to be consi-
dered in connection ""llh :he other 
e\idence in the case in tl1e determ1na-
11on of the gull! or inno..:ence of the 
possessor Such f'Ossess1on 1s 3 (lfCU-
mstance tending in o;,ome degree :o 
gutlt, although i: 5 ncr )Liff1(· 
1en!. standrng alone and ·Jmurportcd 
b\ oiher e\1tknce to >\Jrrant :i Lon·.1-
Llion In addition to the rrnof 1)f :he 
larceny and of •.he pos<>ess1on !he 
defendant, there must be proof o( 
c'Jrroboraung tendi;ig 
of :he;no;;ehes to sho.,., guilt Such 
corroborating c1rcumstJn(n mJ', 
consist of the ,1ct), ::onduct, fJ!sch-
oods. if an). or other Jcclara11011s 1f 
an), of the defendant •\ h1ch tend to 
<;how his guilt 
11,·J 
i l' :11 11 
\, the l!l\!ru..__fl\111\ JHJ n(JI 
JclenJ,rn: he ..__On\1< __ 1eJ "1iel\ 
1'11 :!le b,t'1' th,1! ht' 1\J\ 1n 11! 
lher:: 111 fJ(1, other n1J 
ence \h;Jt Srn1li1 .;;1, 1le ·he ,,nnrhnne th<.11 ,1 \1 
5uref\irnr '>.I\\ hint v.1!h, and tha! 
i ,rnuther SI M.Ht..·, \Uper•.1<inr 'iav. the 'ial(or--
. tiune v. ith J piece of raper Sm 1th·, 
nJrne at1Jd1eJ tu 1l Srn11h JdrrntteJ 
the 111 1mmeJ1..11elv 
pr1< 1 the time ·t pa.,.,neJ His nplan-
a1101, ror hl\ of the <;a,l:ophone, 
that his ...,Lfe ask,,J him to hold II fm her 
O\Crn1ght. V..J<; 1nums1stent ""lth her tes!i-
mPny and \\-llh his adm1ss1on on the 
stand that he had told the Sr. 's superv--
1<;or that he had, 0r ,...as to ha•e, played the 
sa,ophone at a in Ogden the previous 
,...eekend 1 Be!tnda \\ llliams testified that 
Tonia told her Srrnth had something that he 
wa<; going to let Tonia pawn and that the 
object picked up h;. \\ tlliams and Tonia from 
St \1ark '-; \\JS J sa,orihone In add1t1on, 
Tonia te'itified that Smith told her tha! he 
had a say;ophone, needed money, and wanted 
her to ask her friend Belinda 10 pawn 11 
There was sufficient corrobora110g evidence 
to rnpport the necessary inference of guilt 
g1-.en the instructions and the evidence. 
Lest there be a m1sunders1anding of our 
ruling in ca'ie, .\e emphat1cally declare 
that ,.,e do not retreat from Chambers The 
trial i.:ourt should not ha•e used the statutory 
language in !he instrul--t1on for the reasons 
stated in Chambers We hold only that the 
instruction cannot be deemed reverc;ib!e error 
1n !his case in lighc of the clear ey;planatory 
I 1nstruct1ons that all thac the Jury could make 
of the term ·pnma facie" was a perm1ss1ble 
Inference. 
II. 
Smith a!so clan11s that §-6-6-402( l) forces 
a 1.frfrndant lo tJke rhe stand 1n v1olat1on of 
Fifth .\menJ:nc.· l'.ht not to take the 
)!and :o te',<11·. :1·_d States Suprrme 
Court and other ;!Jlc have held that 
the prl'l·ilege is not violated by such J statute. 
E.g. Barnes • L'n1ted Srates. JJ2 US 83"', 
846-47 1197)); S1a1c • D1R1en70, 53 J 
360. 251 .\.2d 99. 110 ( 1969); S1a1e ' Cham-
bers. "'09 P 2d J2J. rUtah 1985). See also 
Annot, 38 .'\.L R.Jd 1178 (1972); I Wharl-
on ·s Cnn11nal E11dence, 139, at 235 t 19"'2) 
I Smith's de-::1s1on ro :est1fv lo rebut ihe pro'ie-
1 cao;,e Jid not \1olate his Fifth .\men-
jment r112h! ·1ntroduc!1.rn ot e\1Jence, 
direct or- -.Hcum5tJnt11I, tending to implicate 
See af(o Sr.1:c 1 n.Jtron, P 2d 621. A23 
(Ut;:ih J9R3l; S1J1e 1 Thomas. 121 l':ah A39, 
64!, 2.u P 2d 653. ()54 Sure. l\1ns-
n . .,.., l'tJh 348. 29" P 24"', 2-n 1JOJll 
Set J/su CosbJ \- Jones. hR2 f· 2J rrJ lll!h I 
Cir 1982) 
! 1he Jcfendanr 111 thl' crime, 1nneao;;es 
·)le rres\ure Jn hu;i tll 1e-;t1fy The mere 
rnaSSlfH!. Jf e\1dence JgJ1mt a defendant 
,_Jn not -he re)i!arJcJ .1 : 1ol..1t1un of his rriv--
aga1n.;;1- )elf 1r.u1m1nat1on • Barnes 1-
Defend;inr '-; rC'l1Jnce .:;n 1 or L rl!rtd 
S1,ires. :rnd I on 1 L 111rcd 1-; m1o;arr 
For L'T.\11 \""NOT-\TlON"'. ).tt lh" se-1'.'ond wt'Hon of ls.-.u". 
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l 111t··j \ -l 12 1. - -- Jna> ailable pur'>uant to Rule 28(2)(e), which 
Ill. 
'h,n h1.-, testimony 
, lr111t·d hc·,Ju<;e he had a 
\wr li(lm tntJf\ing puViuant 
( \ l'lq ·"'R.?.lR .•h1c\qw1\1dec; 
There Jre r:Hl»Ui,11 re]dll0rl'i In ·.o.h1ch 
l! I'> 1hl' [10(\(J 0f the i..l>\ 10 CTICClUfJ.ge 
i.::,11!1df'nlt' 10 rrcser"e 1! 1nv10-
l.lle Therel•>re. a person ..:annot be 
a\ -.1 '<\lltH.''>'i 111 •he frd!0\\1ng 
111 .\ hu<;band c:innot be 
"1\hP\li h'.?r .. ome:it, nor a .,1fe for or 
ig;rn1'1 hrr hulihand 1,1.1thout his 
.'•n<,e'.lt, nor _:in e:ther during the 
rn:Hr!Jge or after'\ClfdS be, 
•)1e .uni;;ent ,,1 •.he other. pv1mined as 
t!J Jn\ .ommu'l1CJt1on made by one 
•o •he ('lhcr Jur1ng the marriage, but 
th1' :Jne-. nut apply 
·1 hre it ·s 0then.,1i;;e specifically 
r''J\ H.kd la"" 1 
:n 1Y"'1, 1tw. C0urr promulgated Rules of 
ruViU.Jllt 'O •,;.h1ch grants 
this l .1ur 1 p(rner to rromulgale rules of 
rrl1Cedure 1nd e·.iLicn('e and y.,hich nullifies 
,3•1, 1n '"cnn1(! ,;.1th 'iuch rules 4 Rule 23(2) 
,, f 1 hu'.e f' 1 ICli s!.11 e5 
..\n J1...::uscd 1n a criminal actron has a 
rm 1;ege to rrc1.rnt h;i;; spouse from 
111 '>Ulh action ""llh respect 
11• 1n1, conf1Lienr13/ C'.Jinmunicat1on 
hJJ '.JT :nadc bet·.1 ecn :hem while they 
·1ere hulit"-:rnd and 
l f\h r 'lit> fHO. J rnore l1n11ted pri\ dege 
'hJn ,et frr1h 1n S"'ll.24-8 Purliua111 to 
2 i Rule 2>12) nullified 
J;, :t ,.,a'> ,\ith Rule 23(2). 
c<>reciJii.1 Rule 23(2He) quo!ed below 
'r1re Dc.1\llll. P 2d 256, 258 (Llah 
lliq5). • 118-1 P 2d 58, 61 !Utah 
\98JJ 5rrnth tl-ierefore had no right under 
2-1-8 to bar from 1e5ttf7ing, but 
dl'J h::i.e '.he r1gt1t 'Jnder and Rule 
2_'1!2) •o bJr 1-:er rro'TI iesnf\'tng about any 
'-onf1dent1JI them 
\en l11tlc ,'! "-m1•h s v.ife 'i •.estimony 
·:nn,,erned :v11t1dent1-11 \I.Ith 
rnr nJ1nrlc, her 'e<,[Jnl('(l\ she 
,,f-.r 11 w:J 'he ,J\0phqn:> lrom St 
c;m11.h :1· -::d. 1hJt ,ii:- l"'.J\e him mone) 
1tte1 ri·• 'he 1111ilfU[11l'!11 J!ld that 
JnJ !lei :1JJ in 'IC' )'-1'' 'led :1 '1- ;int barrel 
:-r 1·. 11 He· "-'' 1 1nl"l. J'> Ill ..1nv 
.ir 1,>r:<. •ctn !i:r .rnJ 1he defendant 
.,, ·llc Ile·, Id her he needed 
1:•J +11 :it '1e h.1d J he 
,.., Jn I 11 " ',- \ l ,_ 11 
11:" \,.II 'i-'J ''"'JI ·Ile l'fl\ilt'ge WJS 
\lJ.tes that neither spouse may claim the priv-
ilege 
if the judge finds that sufficient evid-
ence, aside from the communicat1on, 
has been introduced to warrant a 
finding that the commumcauon was 
made, in .,.. hole or in part, to enable 
or aid anyone to commit or to plan to 
commit a crime or a tort. 
The evidence discussed above, aside from 
the confidential communications, was suffic· 
ient in this case to justify a finding that the 
communications between Smith and his wife 
were made during the planning or commis-
sion of a crime. Therefore, even the more 
limited spousal eYidentiary privilege was not 
J\adable to Smith to bar his wife's lesti· 
mony. 
IV. 
Smith's other claims are also without 
merit. He claims that testimony that he lived 
1n a half-way house informed the jury of the 
fact that he had been convicted of a prior 
felony Smuh recognizes that under Rule 55 
· rnch evidence is admissible to prove some 
other material fact including absence of 
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or 1den· 
tity ·; howe\ er, he claims that no special rele· 
;.ance was demonstrated in this case. In addi-
tion, he claims that under Rule 45 the evid· 
ence should have been excluded because its 
prejudice outweighed its probative value. 
Contrary to Smith's claim, the trial court 
only permitted parties and witnesses to refer 
to his residence as Except for 
Smith's own testimony, no other evidence 
[ indicated that St. Mark's was a half-way 
I 
house It "'as not until Smith took the stand 
that the jury heard that he had previously 
been convicted of a felony and that his resid-
ence was a half-way house. Even then, the 
I 
judge gave an appropriate cautionary instru· 
ction to the jury that the evidence could only 
be considered in assessing credibility. 
Clearly the trial Judge dealt with the problem 
I 
1n a proper manner, <µ)d the claim of error 
has no substance. . 
\ Affirmed. · 
! WE CONCUR: 
I 
Gordon R Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C Howe, Justice 
, Christine M Durham, Jus11ce 
1 \1ichae! D. Zimmerman, Justice 
] I. The Court also instructed: 
I The mere fact that a person was in conscious possession of recently 
1_8 R_F,P<J_R 13_ ____ 
ju'>t1fy .J lOn\tClJOn of tildt r:1cr',' I 
must be proof of l)lher 
tending of tllem<>ehe<; t,"'I e''.Jt·:1<,li 
guilt HoY.e\er, SULh ptl,of need not 
be establ1\hed by add1t10nJI e·.1Jen.::e 
or \\ltnnses if you finJ th.it •he 
p o ' s e s s 1 o n o c c u r r e J 11 n J e r 
.:ircumstances 1,1,hich v.arrants !qcj J 
finding of guilty. Jn this lDnnect1on 
vou ma., .:onsider the Lh:fe:iJ,,11t , 
conduct, an) false or 
statements, o.nd any other sraternrnts 
the Jefendanl may ha\e made ""llh 
reference to the pr0perty If :he 
defendant g1\e<; a !Jlse acrnun• of 
how he Jcquired ro,\ess1on of '\lolen 
pror'-"rtv thic; 1s a circumstance 1ha! 
ma) tend '.O sho...,. gudt 
Jn the ab5ence of evidence as to 
•>.hy the defendant :n 
of recently stolen property, ;ou ma; 
infer that :he defendant stole the 
propenv 
This 1r.cons1stcncy 1s one of the sort of 
CJrrobcrat;ng ::ir::umstances ,\h1ch ',1,.arr . .rnt 
applJCJtion of the stat'Jlory infereni..:e. Srate 
• Heath. 27 Ctah 2d at 15. P at 91 9 
3. Smith does not claim a '<1o!at1on ol '.he 
marital privtlt:>ge set forth 1n Utah 
Constitution Art1de I, § 12 and §"'"'-l-
which state: '\ \1,ife shall not be 
compd!ed to against her hust-and nor 
1 husband against his'' 1fe 
The Rules <)f E., 1dcnce adopted .n Ir I 
IA.ere supef':ieded by nev. Jf n1dence 
·,1,.h1ch 1Jecame elfe\.:ti'e I, !983 
Hov.evcr, rhe old rules >.ere )1ill in effect at 
time of Sm1th'5 tna!. and \'ill 1 herefore 
1->e apr!ied rn •h15 c•\e 
ADDENDUM B 
